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Abstract
This essay explores a puzzle from the world of property theory, that is from the world of mine
and yours, the basic social organizational molecules with which we build our sense of justice.
The puzzle is this: why is there so little variety in the forms of property people use across the
world? We lack a convincing theory for the “economy of property forms,” where economy is
understoodinthesenseofparsimony. Threepartialanswershavebeensuggested. First, thelimited
number of forms may keep people from wasting property through over-fragmentation. Second, the
limit may economize on communication costs for third parties who want to buy or sell property.
Third, the limit may be an inexpensive way to help verify ownership. But none of these theories
accounts for why obsolete forms persist in many economies, and why value-increasing forms fail
to be created. Perhaps a more satisfying answer will require looking to political economy and to
cognitive psychology. For now, the economy of property forms remains a provocative question.THE ECONOMY OF  PROPERTY FORMS
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I.  I NTRODUCTION
I want to pose a puzzle from the world of property theory, that is 
from  the  world  of  mine  and   yours,  the  basic  social  organizational 
molecules with which we build our sense of justice.  The puzzle is this: 
why is there so little variety in the forms of property people use across 
the world?
For economists and many lawyers, the problem I am posing  is 
invisible.  We typically talk about property in the sense of entitlements, 
some of which may be ratified through legally cognizable forms, but 
others exist informally.  In this vision, property is not something fixed, 
but rather understood relationally,  as a fluid set of rights, duties, powers, 
privileges, in other words we all now follow the 20
th century language of 
property as a shifting bundle of rights.  An infinite number of property 
forms could be cognizable, and as society becomes more complex, on e 
might  expect  more  forms  to  emerge.    For  example,  in  a  draft  paper, 
Harold Demsetz, a leading economist of property rights argues, 
[T]he  more  extensive  specialization  becomes,  the  greater  is  the 
variety  of  private  property  rights  that  is  needed  to  accom modate 
differing production and exchange conditions. The development of 
private property rights . . . [has] mainly been a response to increased 
gains from specialization of production.
1
Indeed we do see more and more  comprehensive resource governance 
though  private  property  systems  –  in  the  post -socialist  world,  in 
securities markets, in cyberspace.  However, what we do not see with 
increased specialization, and perhaps contrary to the basic understanding 
of property as a bundle of rights, is any greater  variety in core private 
property forms.
Bernard  Rudden,  from  Oxford,  introduced  this  problem  in  an 
overlooked 1985 paper when he wrote that “the current literature offers 
no  economic  explanation  of  the  numerus  clausus   (that  is,  the  limited 
number  of  allowa ble  property  forms),  but  seems  largely  to  ignore  its 
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existence.”
2  Or as phrased in a draft article by Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman, why does “property law both define a set of well -
recognized standard forms that property rights can take, and burden  the 
creation of property rights that deviate from those standard forms.”
3  We 
lack a convincing theory of what I call the “economy of property forms,” 
where the term economy is understood in the sense of parsimony.  First, 
I  will  briefly  trace  the  intelle ctual  development  of  the  problem  since 
Rudden.
4
II.  A NTI-FRAGMENTATION, C OMMUNICATION, 
AND VERIFICATION ANSWERS
A.  Anti -Fragmentation.  I took a preliminary kick at the problem 
a  few  years  back  in  work  that  built  on  my  theory  of  anticommons 
property. The idea of anticommons property is straightforward.  We have 
long noted the possibility of a tragedy of the commons, in which people 
waste a resource through  overuse when too many may use a resource.  
Indeed, the image of tragedy forms one of the standar d explanations for 
why we create private property in the first instance, as a mechanism for 
conservation.    The  idea  of  anticommons  property  focuses  us  on  the 
mirror tragedy, the possibility that people may waste a resource through 
underuse when too many pe ople can exclude the others.  Anticommons 
tragedy helps explain many real -world phenomena where governments 
impose hidden costs by creating too many property rights.  In my view, 
the  limits  on  existing  property  forms,  what  I  called  the  boundary 
principle,  functions as a crude mechanism the law has evolved to limit 
the social costs of excessive fragmentation.
5
B.  Communication .  Tom Merrill and Henry Smith argued in an 
article  last  year  that  my  anti -fragmentation  argument  can  not  be 
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sufficient, that law n eed not police fragmentation because buyers and 
sellers who create new property forms would directly bear the costs of 
those new forms. They counter with an communication -based argument 
that  focuses  attention  on  costs  external  to  sellers  and  buyers.
6    They
argue  there  exists  a  point  of  optimal  standardization,  the  numerus 
clausus,  because  marginal  frustration  and  measurement  costs  increase 
with each new form, while marginal benefits decrease because  a  few 
property forms suffice as building blocks for the co mplex transactions a 
modern economy requires.  
Recently, Hansmann and Kraakman countered Merrill and Smith. 
The communication approach may help explain why there exist  some
standard-form property rights, and why  clarity matters, but it does not 
explain w hy law  limits creation of nonstandard forms.  Additional types 
do not reduce the communicative value of standard forms; rather, like 
new words in a language, they generally increase our ability to speak 
precisely or govern resources efficiently.  
C.  Ver ification.   Hansmann and Kraakman propose focusing on 
the  institutional  mechanisms  that  shape  new  forms,  what  they  call 
property  law’s  verification  function.    For  them,  verification  is  the 
primary reason for the numerus clausus, indeed what most distinguis hes 
property from contract.  Buyers need to verify  whether sellers have the 
power  to  sell  more  than  they  worry  about  the  content  of  rights.  
Transferability is the key, and the solution lies in a verification system 
that establishes rules for determining w ho among competing claimants 
will  be  awarded  a  right.    Verification  systems  range  from  simple 
possession, which allows easy identification of ownership but no divided 
rights,  to  branding  or  labeling,  to  public  registries  that  may  costly  to 
administer  and  a ccess  but  that  can  economically  support  numerous 
property forms once they are established.  Their theory asks us to look 
more closely at verification institutions and to think about the third party 
information dilemmas the they solve.  And there stands the  debate.
III. T HE STRANGE ECONOMY OF  PROPERTY FORMS
A.  The Survivor Game .  None of these theories answers the 
problem of why we still have both too many and too few for ms.  Let’s 
start with “too many.”  If, as Hansmann and Kraakman suggest, having 
obsolete  forms  continue  in  force  does  not  impose  additional 
communication costs, and if some people continue to rely on the form, 
6 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,  Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
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then there is no particular reason to be rid o f any, once created.  Once 
you have to check the records to verify whether you are dealing with a 
life estate or fee simple, the continued existence of some fee complicated 
imposes no further cost.  The numerus clausus seems a one way ratchet.  
But since f eudal times, many quaint forms have disappeared including 
dower  and  curtesy,  fee  tails,  incorporeal  hereditaments  such  as 
advowsons and corodies and so on.
7  By the way, I would vote the fee 
simple  determinable  off  the  island  next,  and  there  are  a  few  more
survivors to boot out.   Over the past 500  years, on net, the numerus 
clausus has shrunk.  None of our theories explains attrition in property 
forms.
B.  Of BLIDs and LADs .  On the other side of the coin, there are 
many  missing forms.  Some new forms have emerged, ranging from the 
private trust to the limited liability corporation in organizational law; the 
right of publicity, right of integrity, and misappropriation of information 
in intellectual property.  But these for ms hardly seem to exhaust the field 
of  useful  candidates.    On  the  real  property  side,  Robert  Ellickson,  a 
numerus clausus entrepreneur writes,
[I]t is worth recalling that during the past half century the passage of 
enabling  acts  sparked  the  rapid  spread  of  two  significant  micro -
territorial  institutions,  namely,  condominium  associations  and 
Business Improvement Districts.  Those precedents demonstrate that 
spontaneous  order  has  its  limits.    It  appears  that  lawyers  and 
legislators  – despite their plummeting  reputations  – at times can play 
a constructive role in propagating fresh institutional arrangements.
8
Bob  Ellickson  noticed  a  gap  in  property  forms  designed  to  solve  a 
particular intermediate -level collective action problems.  New residential 
communities  can  use  homeowners’  associations;  existing  commercial 
areas can create business improvement districts.  But existing residential 
city blocks or neighborhoods cannot retrofit themselves to provide local 
public  goods.    Absent  an  off -the-rack  property  form,  l ike  Ellickson’s 
proposed  block -level  improvement  districts  (BLIDs),  homeowners  are 
walking past piles of $100 bills.
In a second example, my colleague Rick Hills and I are preparing 
an  article  that  considers  the  virtues  of  LADs,  land  assembly  districts 
designed  to  avoid  another  common,  costly  intermediate -level 
7 A.W.B.  S IMPSON,  A  H ISTORY  OF  THE  LAND  LAW  103  (2d  ed.  1986);  R.E. 
MEGARRY  & H.W.R . W ADE, T HE  LAW OF  REAL  PROPERTY 814 -817 (5
th ed. 1984).
8 Robert C. Ellickson,  New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods , 48  DUKE  L.J. 75 
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coordination failure.  Now, land assemblers face laborious negotiations 
and holdouts or they seek to commandeer local eminent domain power, 
as in the Poletown case.  A LAD would be a special purpose  bargaining 
unit, like unitization in oil and gas fields, that would create a community 
counterpart able to negotiate a binding deal with the developer, would 
allow  the  relevant  micro -community  to  capture  more  neighborhood 
consumer  surplus  than  does  the  em inent  domain  alternative,  would 
reduce  secondary  rent -seeking,  and  would  unlock  the  potential  value 
from larger plots.  LADs address the waste from underuse of resources 
that I call anticommons tragedy.
9
C.  The Liberal Commons Form .  BLIDs and LADs, like condos 
and limited liability companies before them, would fill a more general 
gap in the numerus clausus, a lack of property forms that unlock value 
trapped  by  otherwise  intractable  collective  action  problems  when   the 
optimal scale of use changes.  The gap spans group property settings 
where  the  relevant  resource  is,  as  Carol  Rose  says,  “private  on  the 
outside,  commons  on  the  inside.”
10    She  calls  this  understudied  area 
“limited  commons  property,”  Elinor  Ostrom  labe ls  it,  “common  pool 
resources.”
11  I am advocating we call it a “liberal commons” because 
each new property form in this arena must solve a recurring set of both 
liberal and commons dilemmas to be admitted to the numerus clausus.
12
To appeal to, and be acce pted as legitimate by, owners of sole private 
property, a new group property form must protect owners’ liberty and 
autonomy concerns while offering them the social and economic gains 
possible in a well -governed commons.
9 Michael A. Heller,  The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
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IV.    C ONCLUDING  REMARKS:  Q UESTIONING  THE  LANGUAGE  OF 
PROPERTY
The liberal commons form circles me back to a question for this 
conference.  If you agree with the economists that a greater “variety of 
private property right s is needed to accommodate differing production 
and  exchange  conditions,”  if  you  agree  with  the  legal  theorists  that 
“lawyers  and  legislators  at  times  can  play  a  constructive  role  in 
propagating fresh institutional arrangements,” if you agree with me the 
numerus clausus has too few group property forms, then what comes 
next?  How can people catalyze new property forms or in some cases 
destroy old ones?
Perhaps the political economy of the numerus clausus matters as 
much as the economy.  New property forms  do not spring into existence 
unbidden because, as Carol and others have written, the same types of 
collective action problems that stymie efficient resource deployment in 
the  private  arena  also  operate  in  the  political  arena.    Additionally, 
psychological ( or biological) explanations may help explain the property 
form gap.  People do not lobby for forms that create wealth they have not 
yet seen, may not be able to capture, and cannot yet imagine.  Just as it is 
difficult  for  potential  immigrants,  future  resi dents,  to  defend  their 
interests in city politics, it is hard for potential property forms to make 
their virtues known.
All of these approaches bring us to a deeper set of questions at 
the  core  of  property  theory,  such  as  what  really  is  property?  How  is 
property  different  from  contract,  and  what  if  anything  turns  on  these 
distinctions?  Is our language of property out of date?  How useful today 
is the “bundle of rights” image, the “tragedy of the commons” metaphor, 
the  idea  of  private  property  as  “sole  and   despotic  dominion”  or  the 
standard trilogy of ownership as private, commons, or state. All these 
analytic  tools  have  been  enormously  productive  over  the  past  few 
generations,  but  perhaps  now  they  serve  to  limit  imagination  and 
innovation at the frontiers  of property.  
“Why do we have so few property forms” is a great question, one 
I hope and expect will continue to produce exciting, provocative work.